Numerous studies have documented the advances in ICT equipment, in particular IT hardware, and its contribution to growth in both the US and Europe. Less has been done to measure the contribution of communications technology, the C in ICT. In this paper we focus on the direct eect of CT capital deepening on labour productivity in a sources of growth framework. We construct an international dataset composed of the US and thirteen European countries and produce new estimates of the contribution of ICT capital over the period 1995-2013. We present contributions to labour productivity for each ICT asset (IT hardware, CT equipment and software) using alternative ICT deators from national statistical institutes, harmonised deators from the OECD and our own harmonised deators. We nd that: (a) there are still considerable disparities in measures of ICT price change across OECD countries; (b) however, in terms of growth-accounting estimates, harmonisation of price indices has a greater impact on the measured contributions of IT hardware and software in the EU relative to the US, rather than that of CT equipment; (c) thus, dierences between the US and EU in terms of the contribution of CT capital deepening are largely due to dierences in measured CT capital services and the CT income share, whereas of the dierences in the contribution of IT hardware (and to a lesser extent, software) capital deepening, more is explained by dierences in the estimated price of IT hardware (software); (d) over the period 2000-13, using national ICT deators, CT capital deepening accounted for 0.09% pa (5.7% as a share) of growth in labour productivity in the US, compared to 0.02% pa (1.9% as a share of labour productivity growth) in the EU-13; (e) using harmonised ICT deators from the OECD, the gure for the EU-13 rises to 0.04% pa (3.9% as a share) of growth in labour productivity.
) and earlier studies from Oulton (2002) for the UK and Jorgenson (2001) for the US. However the focus of these studies has generally been on the contribution of ICT equipment, with ICT equipment separated out from non-ICT plant & machinery in the estimation of capital services. This separation allows for improved estimation of capital services from ICT and aggregate capital, with ICT equipment given its own specic depreciation rate (allowing for a higher gross rate of return to ICT assets which typically have a shorter life-length than other types of machinery) and an ICTspecic quality-adjusted deator, which captures increases in the eective volume of ICT investment, due to improvements in the power or eciency of the underlying technology.
The focus on computer hardware or aggregate ICT equipment means however that the C part of ICT has been somewhat neglected ((Doms, 2005 ) (Byrne and Corrado, 2009 ) (Corrado, 2011b) (OECD, 2008) ). When we consider the role and ubiquity of the internet in business activity, this is potentially important. Further, if communications networks generate network eects (or spillovers), then the contribution of telecommunications equipment may also be an implicit component of growth in total factor productivity (TFP).
In this paper we create an international dataset, that includes the US and thirteen European economies, to study the contribution of telecommunications capital (CT) to growth across countries. Following on from the research into IT hardware equipment documented above, we therefore treat all three aspects of ICT capital, including telecommunications equipment (i.e. IT hardware, CT equipment and software), as distinct assets in the estimation of capital services, each with their own asset-specic depreciation rate and price index. We use these data to review growth-accounting estimates for each of the three types of ICT capital 1 in Europe, relative to the US, using the national deators applied in the national accounts of individual countries and submitted to the OECD by national statistical institutes (NSIs) as a benchmark, and also experimenting with sets of harmonised deators consistent with the hedonic price index produced by the US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), including the harmonised ICT deators produced by the OECD (Schreyer and Colecchia, 2002) .
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The OECD harmonised deators are typically more aggressive 3 than national ICT price indices, being based on US constant-quality price indices for IT, CT and software.
4 Thus, in the case of CT, the OECD harmonised index sets the ratio of the price of CT capital to non-ICT capital in each country equal to the ratio in the US, so that movements in the price of CT capital relative to non-ICT capital in the US also 1 Another aspect of investment in ICT or digital assets is investment in data. In the System of National Accounts (SNA), the nomenclature for the asset category which includes software is actually computerised information, which consists of software but also databases. However, it is thought that current national accounting methods do not well measure what are fast growing investments in data assets. To the extent that data (as an asset) is currently measured in the national accounts, it is an implicit part of the data for software. Therefore in this paper, where we refer to software, we are actually referring to computerised information which includes databases. In a series of papers, Goodridge and Haskel (e.g. (Goodridge et al., 2015) , Goodridge and Haskel (2015b) , Goodridge and Haskel (2015a) , Goodridge and Haskel (2016) ) attempt to measure UK market sector investment in data and its contribution to growth, including an estimate of just how much of that investment is already recorded in the UK national accounts.
2 We thank Vincenzo Spiezia of the OECD for sending us these data.
3 For instance, the national deator for CT equipment for Spain rises at an average rate of +0. 44% pa, 1990-2013 . The OECD harmonised deator for Spain, for the same period, falls at an average rate of -3.54% pa.
4 In forming price indices for computers and peripheral equipment, semiconductors and software, the US Bureau of Economic Analysis employ a hedonic approach to separate out the components of price changes that are due to improvements in product characteristics. See for example Moulton (2001). apply to other countries. The same method is also used in generating harmonised deators for IT hardware and also software. We also produce our own harmonised price indices for ICT assets, setting the ratio of the price of ICT investment to the implied price of value-added in each country equal to the ratio in the US, thus adjusting the price of ICT for dierences in general ination between countries. For each set of deators, we produce international growth-accounting results and test the impact of the deator on each of the ICT parameters.
The rest of this paper is set out as follows. Section 2 sets out the framework. Section 3 describes features of our dataset and its construction. Section 4 presents our results and nally, section 5 concludes.
Framework and existing literature
In this paper we conduct a sources of growth decomposition for fourteen OECD economies: the US, and thirteen European countries.
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The underlying model applied to each country is set out below.
Model
First we set out a sources-of-growth relation for each country. GDP in each economy grows as:
Where Q is real whole economy value-added, L are labour services, 6 K are capital services and total factor productivity (TFP) is dened as a residual. Alternatively we can set the relation out in per hour terms, as:
Where H are annual person-hours worked. In equations (1) and (2), s is an income share for each factor input X, estimated as an average over the two periods (we omit the usual overbar just to ease notation):
and s K Q ≡ 1 2
Where P L , P K and P Q are the prices of labour, capital and value-added, respectively. In equations (1) and (2), capital and labour services are translog aggregations over heterogeneous capital types aa and labour types b respectively: ∆lnL = s 6 Where labour services are a measure of labour input adjusted for the composition of the workforce, with growth in the hours worked of dierent composition groups weighted with that groups share of the total wagebill. Thus labour services consist of volume (i.e. hours worked), with an adjustment for the quality, or more accurately, composition, of the workforce. For more on measurement of labour services, see section 3.5.
∆lnK = s
Kaa K ∆lnK aa,t
where H b are the annual person-hours worked by type b workers and the shares here are shares of total capital and labour payments for each type, again averaged over the current and previous period in order to form a superlative index:
and s Kaa K ≡ 1 2
Labour is in natural units, hours. For capital, we have nominal capital investment in asset type aa and a price index for investment goods of each type. Thus we build capital stocks of type aa by a perpetual inventory model so that for K aa we have:
K aa,t = P * Iaa I aa P Iaa + (1 − δ Kaa )K aa,t−1
Where δ Kaa is an asset-specic depreciation rate and note that P * I , the true price of investment in asset aa, may dier from the measured price of investment, P I . The inputs side of the model is completed by the user-cost relation between P I and P K :
P Kaa = P Iaa (ρ + δ Kaa − (∆P Iaa /P Iaa ))
Where ρ is an economy-wide nominal net rate of return and ∆P Iaa /P Iaa is the capital gain/loss that results from holding the asset. 
From (11) it is clear that faster growth in I aa , due to slower growth (or faster decline) in P Iaa , will result in stronger growth in ∆lnQ, thus making clear that adjusting measurement of P Iaa changes both input and output.
Aggregation
In our analysis, as well as presenting data for individual countries, we also work with country groups e.g. All
Countries, EU-13, US, Scandinavia, Large Northern European Economies, Small Open Northern European
Economies and Southern Europe. (See Table 1 for a complete list of the countries and country groups in our data.) The relation between individual countries and higher-level aggregates is as follows. Real GDP in the aggregate (synthetic) country group grows as in (1) but where the shares for K and L are shares in aggregate 7 Due to incomplete data across countries, in this paper we do not apply tax adjustment factors to the estimation of user costs.
8 Where government consumption and investment are subsumed into C and I respectively, and we omit international trade for simplicity.
value-added for the country group. Or put another way, all components of (1) can be aggregated as a share weighted sum, where the weights are that country's share in the nominal value-added of the country group:
Existing literature
How does this paper relate to others? Van Ark and Inklaar (2005) study the contribution of ICT across countries using the EUKLEMS dataset, which includes harmonised price indices for IT equipment for countries that do not make an adjustment for quality change, but does not include harmonised constant-quality price indices for CT equipment or software (O'Mahony and Timmer, 2009 ). Oulton (2002) and Jorgenson (2001) also conduct growth-accounting for the UK and US respectively, with a focus on the contribution of aggregate ICT equipment and also software.
Our paper is also related to van Ark et al. (2008) , who study the productivity gap between Europe and the US, contrasting the speed-up in the US with the slowdown in Europe, which they party attribute to lower contributions from ICT production but also from ICT capital accumulation, particularly in the market services sector. However, they attribute most of the dierence in the US-EU performance to lower growth in TFP, which they suggest may partly be due to lower ICT capital deepening, possibly due to a lower contribution from complementary, but unmeasured, intangible capital, thus inhibiting innovation. Jorgenson et al. (2008) also note the acceleration in US TFP in the late 1990s, and the subsequent slowdown post-2004. This acceleration started in the ICT-producing industries and, as ICT prices fell, was also clearly evident in industries that use ICT intensively. Jorgenson et al. (2003) conclude that ICT capital deepening and ICT-induced TFP growth explain over three-quarters of the US productivity acceleration in the late 1990s. Similarly, Oliner and Sichel (2000) estimate that almost all of the US productivity acceleration can be explained by ICT.
In a series of papers, Brynjolfsson, Hitt and Yang (e.g. Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2003) ) measure the ICT contribution using rm-level data. They estimate that the full benets of ICT investment accrue with lags of ve to seven years, which they conclude either reects ICT externalities taking time to transmit, or the need to invest in complementary intangible capital, particularly organisational capital, in order to reap the full productivity benets of ICT investments. Gordon (2016) argues however that the benets of ICT are more evolutionary and pale in comparison to those of other revolutionary and more consequential inventions and innovations over the past century, such as those in electricity, lighting, indoor heating and plumbing, construction, healthcare, transport and early communications technology, which cannot be repeated.
More specically, on CT and its treatment as a distinct asset separate from IT hardware, Doms (2005) , Corrado (2011a) and Byrne and Corrado (2009) form new estimates of price change for CT equipment but do not conduct growth-accounting. Schreyer and Colecchia (2002) construct harmonised deators for ICT (IT, CT and software) assets, using price dierentials with non-ICT investment prices in the US. We also apply these deators in our own growth decompositions; data and methods are set out below. They nd that applying their harmonised indices raises growth rates in real ICT investment and ICT capital services 9 Where, in the aggregation, country nominal value-added is converted to USD using purchasing power parities (PPPs) and aggregate value-added is a sum of PPP-adjusted country nominal value-added (in USD).
in countries that do (did) not control for quality change in estimating ICT prices. Jalava and Pohjola (2008) use US price data for IT and CT equipment to re-estimate the ICT contribution to growth in Finland.
Data
The dataset constructed for this paper was primarily built using country-level total economy data downloaded from OECD.Stat, which contains national accounts data submitted to the OECD from the national statistical institutes (NSIs) of member countries. Where data were incomplete or missing, the data were supplemented with other sources, with some extrapolation or imputation where necessary. All extrapolations or imputations are documented below.
Time period
For most countries, our data run from 1990 to 2013. However, for some countries the data start later. We therefore conduct all analysis over the period 1995-2013, so that all larger countries are included for that period. For some countries (namely Belgium (1999) , Denmark (1999 ), Ireland (1999 ), Portugal (1999 and Sweden (1997) ) the data begin later than 1995 so results for the period 1995-2000 are missing for those countries. The years for which our data are suciently complete to conduct our growth-accounting analyses are set out in Table 1 , by country. Table 1 shows the countries in our dataset (column 1), along with the rst and last years for which we are able to carry out our growth-accounting analysis (columns 2 and 3), and with details of specic adjustments made to individual countries to ll in missing data (column 4). Notes on more general adjustments that apply to all countries are presented below. In our analysis, we present results for individual countries and also each of the country groups listed, as well as the EU-13 and All countries.
Countries
In addition to the country-specic adjustments set out above, the following adjustments apply to all countries. The latest revision to the SNA (UnitedNations, 2008) incorporates cultivated and biological assets as capital.
10 However, data on GFCF in this asset category is missing for many countries in the OECD.Stat data, including the US. We therefore exclude this asset from our productivity decomposition. GFCF in mineral exploration and artistic originals (or copyrights) is not presented separately in the OECD.Stat data.
It is therefore backed out as a residual, as total GFCF in intellectual property products (IPPs) less GFCF in R&D and software. For all countries, missing data on GFCF in IPP assets were lled in making use of the IPP total and calculating other assets as a residual, including if necessary, using the share of GFCF in a particular asset in previous years and the IPP total to impute estimates for missing years. Where data for mineral exploration and artistic originals remained missing, these were lled in using data from either Intan-Invest (Corrado et al., 2012) or EUKLEMS (O'Mahony and Timmer, 2009) . Note, data from IntanInvest are for the market sector, so we necessarily assume that the market sector makes all investments in these two asset types, as opposed to any government investment.
In the OECD.Stat data, ICT equipment is dened as the aggregate of IT hardware and CT equipment and so does not include software. Where data on GFCF in IT or CT are missing, data are either estimated as a 10 Cultivated assets are a new asset category introduced into the System of National Accounts (SNA) in the 2008 revision. They include livestock and plantations that yield repeat products. OECD, 2015) , changes in gross value-added, and the share of CT GFCF in ICT equipment. Similarly for other assets/countries, for years where GFCF data are missing, data are imputed using the prole of the same respective series in EUKLEMS. Where data on GFCF in R&D are missing, data are extrapolated or imputed using cross-country data on Gross Expenditure on R&D (GERD), downloaded from the OECD.
Imputed data make use of the ratio between R&D GFCF and GERD in countries where both series' are available.
The GFCF price index for each asset, and the value-added price index, are derived implicitly using constant and current price data, and the price index re-referenced to 2005=1. Nominal GFCF and the price index are then extrapolated using data from EUKLEMS when available, and the constant price series' are re-estimated using the re-referenced price index. To deate GFCF in mineral exploration and artistic originals, we apply the aggregate price index for IPPs. Where national price indices for either software are missing or unavailable, we either apply the aggregate price index for IPPs, or extend the asset price index using the aggregate price index for IPPs. To deate GFCF in R&D, we use the gross value-added price index for each country.
For capital stock initial values, where we have estimates from EUKLEMS, the initial value (re-based to 2005 prices) from EUKLEMS is used. Where we have no information from EUKLEMS (e.g. as for R&D), the initial value is estimated using the standard steady-state formula, K t = I t /(g + δ), where g is mean growth in real investment and δ is the asset-specic depreciation rate.
For labour income, OECD/NSI data on compensation of employees do not include any element of labour renumeration for the self-employed. We therefore take estimates of the labour income share directly from the Total Economy Database (TED) produced by The Conference Board, and backcast it using the implied labour income share from EUKLEMS, both of which do include an estimate of self-employed mixed income that is a return to labour. Data on growth in annual hours worked are also taken from the TED, and benchmarked to the level in the OECD.Stat data in 2013. Data on growth in labour services and therefore labour composition are also taken directly from TED.
Data on gross value-added are backcast using EUKLEMS where available. When we switch between alternative deators for ICT assets, we make a corresponding adjustment to the value-added price index, so that real gross value-added incorporates the change to real GFCF.
Output and Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF)
For output, we use data from OECD.Stat on total economy nominal and real gross value added (GVA) at basic prices. Data on nominal and real gross xed capital formation (GFCF) in intellectual property products (IPPs, that is R&D, software, mineral exploration and artistic originals (GFCF in the latter two assets are combined)), computer hardware (IT), telecommunications equipment (CT), other plant and machinery (P&M or p), vehicles (v) and (non-residential) buildings (b) are also from OECD.Stat. We exclude GFCF Vertical line in 2008 to mark the recession. Data in national currencies converted to USD billions using OECD PPPs.
in dwellings which are not capital in the context of productivity analysis.
11 All specic adjustments to ll in incomplete data are set out in and below Table 1 . Where data for the US were missing, nominal GFCF in R&D, mineral exploration and artistic originals were downloaded from the US BEA to replace or extend the existing data. For Sweden, GFCF data were lled in and extended using data downloaded from Statistics Sweden.
In Figure 1 below, we document nominal GFCF in CT capital equipment across countries. To ease comparison, estimates are converted to US dollars (USD) using purchasing power parity (PPP) data downloaded from the OECD.
12 As expected, nominal investment in CT capital is, by some distance, highest in the US. In 2013, GFCF in CT equipment was $102.4bn in the US, followed by $11.7bn in Germany, $8.4bn
in Italy, $6.3bn in France, $4.1bn in Spain, $3.1bn in Austria, $2.6bn in Sweden, $2.4bn in Belgium, $1.6bn
in the UK, $1.2bn in the Netherlands, $1bn in Portugal, $0.5bn in Finland, $0.5bn in Ireland and $0.3bn in Denmark.
11 Strictly, for consistency, we should therefore also exclude the output of the real estate sector from GVA, since this is largely made up of the actual and imputed rents (for owner-occupiers) of dwellings. However data on the output of the real estate sector were not available for all countries. We therefore use total economy GVA including actual and imputed rents for each country, but note this issue in our data and estimation. 
UK GFCF in communications equipment (CT)
UK data on nominal GFCF in CT equipment were taken from OECD.Stat, in turn from the UK national accounts. We note that of the estimates presented above, the estimate for investment in CT equipment in the UK is, by some distance, the smallest of all large, advanced European economies, and is considerably lower than in a number of much smaller economies. Ocial estimates for the UK are also in stark contrast to estimates from our previous work (Goodridge et al., 2013b ) (hereafter, GHW) and those in EUKLEMS (both estimated using previous vintages of the Input-Output Supply and Use tables (SUTs)). A comparison of ocial UK estimates with those in GHW and EUKLEMS is presented below in Figure 2 , with each series in UK ¿ sterling. As is clear from the gure, the latest revised UK data do not incorporate the dramatic run-up of investment in the late 1990s as observed in GHW, interpreted there as the creation of network infrastructure, and also EUKLEMS. In comparison the ocial series is at, with a clear level dierence of at least ¿2bn for most of the period concerned. In 2001, the peak of UK telecoms investment, the dierence between GHW and the latest ocial estimates is as much as ¿5.6bn. The dierence between EUKLEMS and ocial estimates is even greater. We therefore use estimates from GHW as an alternative series for UK investment in CT, with estimates extrapolated forward (from 2009) using growth rates taken from the ocial series.
From Figure 1 we can see that for most countries, nominal investment in CT capital grew relatively strongly in the late 1990s and/or early 2000s and has since slowed, or in some cases declined. In Figure 3 we present indices of nominal investment (converted to USD using OECD PPPs and indexed) for the aggregate of the fourteen countries in our dataset, for: tangible capital excluding ICT equipment (Tang excl ICT); intangible capital as estimated in the national accounts (NA Intang, that is, software, mineral exploration, artistic originals and R&D), IT hardware (IT), and communications equipment (CT). The index for investment in each asset group is set to 2000=1. Of the four asset types or groups, nominal GFCF in CT grew most rapidly in the 1995-2000 period at a mean rate of 11.6% pa, compared to 8.7% pa for IT hardware, 6% pa for tangibles excluding ICT equipment and 8.9% pa for national accounts intangibles. However, after 2000, nominal GFCF in ICT equipment declined, with CT investment growing at -1.6% pa on average in the pre-recession 2000-07 period and IT at -1.5% pa, compared to 4.9% pa for tangibles excluding ICT and 5.5% pa for national accounts intangibles. In the post-recession 2007-13 period, mean growth in nominal GFCF in CT equipment has remained negative at -0.8% pa, as has growth in nominal IT investment at -1.4%
pa, compared with -0.4% pa for tangibles excluding ICT. Interestingly, nominal GFCF in intangibles has continued to grow during and after the recession, at a rate of 3.4% pa. The relative strength of investment in intangibles relative to tangibles during and since the recession is noted in Goodridge et al. (2013a) .
Of course, although the nominal value of CT investment has been at or declining since around 2000 (in terms of the all country aggregate used here), that does not mean that the real volume of CT investment has remained at or declined. That depends on the price per unit of telecommunications investment, which in turn depends partly upon the eciency characteristic of CT goods and how that has changed over time. In other words, ¿100 of telecoms investment in 2013 has considerably greater real volume (i.e. buys considerably more) than ¿100 of telecoms investment in 2000. For instance, in the 1990s and early 2000s, investments in bre optic cable and equipment increased network capacity by a factor of forty (Doms, 2005 
Prices
For the price of value-added and GFCF, our national price indices are derived implicitly using current and constant price data. Since dierent countries have dierent base years in the OECD.Stat data, all price indices are re-referenced to 2005=1, and all constant price series' are re-estimated using the re-referenced price index. Where data for the US were missing, GFCF price indices were downloaded directly from the BEA. For Sweden, GFCF price indices were extended using data downloaded from Statistics Sweden.
As noted above, the key lesson learned from research into the contribution of ICT equipment to growth, is that accurate measurement of real ICT investment and growth in ICT capital services required use of hedonic or quality-adjusted deators (see for example Triplett (2004) ). In cases where national practice is to not develop country-specic quality-adjusted deators, researchers (or in some cases, NSIs) have favoured the use of the US BEA hedonic index or some version adjusted for application to that country, or sets of harmonised deators across countries, such as those in EUKLEMS for instance . This way measures of changes in ICT prices reect improvements in power and other characteristics, as well as falls in listed prices, and thus measures of real ICT investment and capital services reect changes in the real quantity of capital available for production.
For ICT assets, including software, we work with three sets of alternative deators. First, as a benchmark, we apply the (implied) deators submitted to the OECD by NSIs. Obviously national practice in the measurement of the price of CT equipment (and indeed other aspects of ICT investment) varies across countries, and so results and comparisons based on these national deators are aected by that. Second, we have harmonised deators for each ICT asset (IT, CT and software), produced by the OECD (Schreyer and Colecchia, 2002) . The method for harmonisation involves taking the ratio of ICT to non-ICT asset prices in the US and applying that ratio to other countries. Or in terms of the log change, the log change in the ICT price index for the chosen country is estimated as the log change in the US price index, less the log change in the US non-ICT price index, plus the log change in the non-ICT price index in the chosen country, as set out in equation (14).
Third, we produce our own set of harmonised deators, again based on US ICT GFCF price indices, but adjusting for relative ination according to changes in the price of value-added in the US and the relevant country, rather than changes in the price of non-ICT assets, as set out in equation (15).
In our estimation, when switching between alternative deators for GFCF, we adjust the GVA deator to account for this, so that GVA prices are consistent with GFCF prices, and real GDP is therefore consistent with real GFCF.
It might be argued that use of the US price index, either in original or adjusted/harmonised form, for other countries is not appropriate if those countries face dierent prices or if the composition of telecommunications investment diers across countries. However, rst, as noted in Corrado (2011b) , the pattern and prole of price changes in CT equipment is remarkably similar across a diverse range of technologies, products and varieties. Second, these are internationally traded products and so we would expect them to be priced competitively across countries. And third, the use of US ICT price indices has become accepted research practice, and in some cases these indices are also applied by NSIs in national measurement.
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The following charts present the price indices in our dataset for each ICT asset, and compare national deators 14 with harmonised deators produced by the OECD, and our own version of harmonised deators produced for this paper (GHE). First, Figure 4 compares the three sets of deators for CT equipment, by country, over the period 1990 to 2013. Figure 4 shows considerable dierences in the prole of CT deators between countries. First, we note that the two versions of harmonised deators (OECD (red) and GHE (green)) produce similar proles, with the OECD version generally being slightly more aggressive, with slightly faster price declines particularly toward the end of the series'. In turn, the harmonised deators are typically more aggressive than the 13 UK estimates of capital services produced by the ONS make use of (exchange rate or PPP adjusted versions) of US price indices for IT hardware and pre-packaged software.
14 Details of any imputation or interpolation for national price indices are provided in or below Table 1. national deators (blue). The prole of national CT deators however diers considerably across countries.
We note in particular that national price indices in Austria, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy and the Netherlands are relatively at and show little sign of fast falls in the price of CT equipment, with some indices exhibiting rising prices. Note, in the case of Spain, this is not limited to CT prices, with the deator presented here being for the aggregate for ICT equipment and so includes the price of IT hardware, which is an unusual result.
National deators for other countries are generally more aggressive, in particular, for Denmark, Portugal, Sweden and the UK, and also but to a lesser extent, Germany. For Denmark, we note that separate national deators for CT and IT equipment were not available, so the price index presented here is for aggregate ICT equipment and so incorporates the well-documented declines in the price of IT hardware. For Portugal, the CT price index is less aggressive than the harmonised deators in the late 1990s, but exhibits faster falling prices than either version of the harmonised deators in recent years prior to 2013. For the UK, the national price index falls at a faster rate than either version of the harmonised deators, particularly in the 1990s and less so in more recent years. For Germany, the price index presented here is taken from EUKLEMS.
The national price indices for Belgium, Spain, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy and the Netherlands each have some unusual features. The index for Belgium exhibits price falls pre-2005, but price rises after. As noted above, the index for Spain, an ICT equipment price index, shows rising prices, with only some evidence of price falls for later years. The indices for Finland, Italy and the Netherlands are relatively at pre-2005, but exhibit stronger price declines thereafter, and in the case of Finland, declines which are even stronger than those in the harmonised indices based on US data. The index for France is also relatively at throughout the period, with some gentle price falls. Finally, the index for Ireland is also at prior to 2005, before falling aggressively at a rate in line with the harmonised indices, and then starting to rise such that it diverges strongly from the harmonised price indices.
In Figure 5 we conduct the same exercise but this time comparing deators for IT hardware equipment.
First, we note that in the case of IT equipment there seems to be a larger degree of consistency across countries, although again there are some countries for which the IT price index looks unusual in comparison to either of the harmonised deators. For instance, the IT price index for Austria falls quite rapidly in the early 1990s before slowing and having a relatively at prole for the rest of the period. For Belgium, the price index is almost at throughout. For Denmark, the price index falls, although at a slower rate than the harmonised indices, and for Spain the index is at in comparison to the harmonised deators. Note, for Denmark and Spain, the IT price index presented here is actually a price index for aggregate ICT equipment (IT & CT) as separate national indices for IT and CT were not available. For Finland, the price index is quite aggressive, falling at a comparable rate to the harmonised deators. For France, the index falls gently in the 1990s and early 2000s, and then at a rate more comparable to the harmonised indices post-2005. For Germany, the index is similar to the harmonised deators, although note, this is also a harmonised (IT) deator from EUKLEMS, as national ICT deators for Germany were not available in the ocial data. For Ireland, the IT price index has a similar pattern to the CT price index. IT prices fall in the late 1990s, although at a slower rate than in the harmonised indices, before diverging and rising in the post-2005 period.
For Italy, the price index exhibits price falls in the early 1990s, but is at thereafter. For the Netherlands, price falls according to the national index are very similar to those according to the harmonised deators.
For Portugal, the IT index declines very slowly in the late 1990s, with faster falls post-2005, at a rate similar to those implied by the harmonised indices. Similarly for Sweden, which shows price falls slower than the harmonised deators pre-2005, but slightly faster price falls than the harmonised indices post-2005. Finally, the national IT price index for the UK is shown to be quite aggressive throughout the period studied, 
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In practice, national measurement of software prices also partly reects the composition of software investment in each country. Measured software GFCF has three components: pre-packaged; custom and own-account, where the latter is an estimate of software development that takes place and is used in-house and is not intended for nal sale. Generally, the price of the latter component, own-account, is estimated using a wage index for software programmers, and in the case of the UK, with a small adjustment for assumed 15 Ocial UK NSI data for the price of software, downloaded from OECD.Stat, begin in 1997 and are extrapolated back using the software price changes in EUKLEMS. The large price change in 1990-1 is therefore from the EUKLEMS data. productivity growth in the writing of software.
16 Custom software is an element of purchased software but it is typically assumed that its price is more likely to move similarly to that of own-account, and so a number of countries (e.g. the US and UK) apply the own-account index to deate this aspect of software GFCF.
Finally, there is pre-packaged software, the price of which can be observed, and in the case of the US prepackaged index, adjusted for changes in quality/volume using hedonic methods. The UK Oce for National Statistics (ONS) makes use of the US pre-packaged index in its measurement of purchased software.
Labour input
On labour income, the share of labour payments in GVA is taken directly from the Total Economy Database (TED) produced by The Conference Board, the reason being that OECD/NSI data on Compensation of Employees do not include any element of the mixed income earned by the self-employed. The TED data on labour shares do however include an estimate of the labour renumeration (from within mixed income) earned by the self-employed, as does EUKLEMS, which we use to backcast the TED labour share.
For consistency, and to incorporate data on growth in labour services and therefore labour composition, all labour input data are taken from the TED, with growth in annual person-hours worked benchmarked in levels to OECD/NSI data in 2013. As the paper sets out, we can express changes in labour services as the sum of two terms:
where H is total annual person-hours worked and LQH adjusts hours by the eectiveness of each hour (i.e., L = H * LQH). The term LQH is often referred to as labour quality or more correctly, labour composition (in the EUKLEMS dataset for example, this is LAB_QPH, labour services per hour worked) and its increase (multiplied by labour's share in income) is the direct channel whereby human capital accumulation contributes to economic growth. Suppose for example there are skilled and unskilled workers, then we can write this as:
Both returns to learning-by-doing (via experience and thus higher wages) and to schooling (again through higher wages) are embedded in this term. (14); and GHE harmonised refers to our own version of harmonised deators, estimated as set out in equation (15).
composition-adjusted growth in total capital services per hour.
3.6 Capital input (OECD, 2010) reports that a survey of OECD member countries found that 8 of the 13 countries who responded to the survey capitalized databases in principle, but that the values were not separately identiable (Ahmad, 2004) . In separate work for the UK, Goodridge and Haskel (2015; 2015b; 2015a; 2016) estimate UK market sector investment in the building/transformation and analysis of data, and estimate that around 3/4 of such investments are already captured in the ocial measurement of software in the UK.
Results
In this section we set out our growth-accounting results, for individual countries, country groups, the EU-13 and the aggregate of the fourteen countries in our dataset. We conduct three separate growth-accounting exercises, one for each of our three sets of ICT deators (i.e. national deators, OECD harmonised deators and GHE harmonised deators). This way we not only set out the contribution of dierent types of ICT capital to growth, with a focus on CT equipment, but we also shed light on how much of the variation in contributions is explained by diering estimates of price change. Detailed tables of growth-accounting results using each set of deators are set out in Tables 4, 5 and 6 in Appendix A. We present results for countries and country groups for periods : 1995-00; 2000-07; 2007-10; and 2010-13. The rst period covers the late 1990s which, in the UK at least, was a period characterised by high productivity growth and a boom in ICT, and also intangible, investment (Borgo et al., 2013) .
20 The second period gives data for the 2000s prior to the onset of the nancial crisis, which for most countries saw a slowdown in productivity growth and also a slowdown in the contribution of ICT. The third period includes the Great Recession, thus productivity measures are typically negative due to the collapse in labour productivity and TFP that occurred in most countries. We therefore choose to consider this period separately.
The nal period covers the post-recession years, in most countries characterised by continued weakness in productivity growth.
We note that it is usual for growth-accounting to be conducted over chosen periods according to points in the business cycle. This way, endpoints are chosen such that results are less aected by dierences in factor utilisation at dierent points in the cycle. However, here we work with data for a number of countries, meaning that the chosen periods coincide with dierent points in the business cycle for dierent countries.
Thus comparisons between countries may be somewhat aected by this.
Although of course the data vary by country, for (the share-weighted aggregate of ) all countries, the 20 Although we note that the boom in ICT investment in the UK in the late 1990s, observed in previous papers, has largely been revised away in successive revisions to ONS GFCF data.
labour productivity record is one of strong growth in the late 1990s, softening in the 2000s and culminating in weak labour productivity growth in the latest period(s). Of the country groups, the exception to this pattern is Southern Europe, which has weak labour productivity growth throughout the period studied.
In terms of TFP, prior to 2007, TFP was strongest in the Scandinavian countries, with Southern Europe very weak and the US and North European economies somewhere in between. During the recession, Scandinavia and the large North European economies experienced the largest slowdowns in TFP. US TFP growth remained positive even during the recession, although turned slightly negative later. TFP in Southern Europe was very negative, but TFP growth was negative before the recession so the slowdown was less.
In terms of both labour productivity growth and TFP, the strongest recovery in productivity post the Great Recession has occurred in the large Northern European economies, although there too productivity growth remains weak in the 2010-13 period, hence discussion of the productivity puzzle.
21 Scandinavian TFP has also recovered somewhat but remains negative in the latest period. TFP in Southern Europe also remains negative.
The ICT (IT, CT and software) contributions follow a similar pattern to labour productivity, that is, between 18% and 29% of annual growth in these fourteen OECD countries over the period studied.
The only country or country group with absolute ICT contributions higher than the all country average is the US. In the graphics that follow, we shall use the US as a benchmark for comparison purposes. In the US, ICT capital deepening contributed 0.86% pa of annual labour productivity growth of 2.4% pa ( Use of the GHE deators, harmonised using the price of value-added rather than the price of non-ICT capital, has a similar eect. In the case of the EU-13, the total ICT contribution in the late 1990s is raised further to 0.46% pa, compared to 0.86% pa in the US. ICT contributions for other periods are similar to 21 For an analysis of the productivity puzzle in a UK context, see Haskel et al. (2015) . On TFP, the pattern is more mixed. The rst thing that stands out is the strong TFP performance of the Scandinavian countries, especially in the late 1990s and particularly in Finland, where TFP grew at a rate of almost 3% pa in the 1995-00 period. TFP in Denmark and Sweden also grew faster than in the US in the late 1990s, and at rates slightly lower than the US in the 2000s. TFP in Ireland was also substantially higher than in the US in the late 1990s, but less in the 2000s, whilst TFP in Austria was higher than that in the US in both periods. Of the other countries, the TFP performance of the large North European economies (France, Germany, UK) was comparable to the US, with French TFP slightly higher than the US in the late 1990s. TFP growth in Southern Europe, in particular Spain and Italy, was considerably slower than the US.
Moving on to the bottom panel of Figure 9 , we look more closely at the contribution of capital deepening.
Starting with non-ICT capital, top left, the data show a particularly strong contribution in Ireland in both periods. The data also show stronger contributions relative to the US for Sweden (late 1990s), Germany 
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ConDlnKH ( 4.2 Sources of Growth: OECD Harmonised ICT deators Figure 10 presents similar charts to above but this time using the OECD harmonised ICT deators in estimating capital services. We focus on the ICT capital deepening contributions in the bottom panel.
First, from the data for IT hardware (bottom left), we see that the picture has changed considerably for many countries. The dierence in European IT contributions compared to the US in the late 1990s is considerably smaller for most countries, and for some countries it is eliminated entirely. In the 2000s, the majority of countries move from having lower IT contributions relative to the US to having very comparable contributions that are in some cases higher than the US. Moving from left to right, we rst consider the Scandinavian economies. Applying the OECD indices dramatically changes the picture for Denmark, with the IT contribution in the late 1990s raised from 0.14% pa to 0.35% pa, reducing the gap from -0.28% pa to -0.06% pa. In the 2000s, the IT contribution is raised from 0.08% pa to 0.19% pa, such that the gap with the US moves from marginally negative at -0.01% pa, to a positive value of +0.1% pa. For Finland, applying the OECD harmonised deators has little impact, with the national IT deator being just as aggressive as the OECD harmonised version, as shown in Figure 5 . Therefore the IT contribution is slightly reduced, from 0.11% pa to 0.10% pa in the late 1990s, marginally increasing the gap with the US from -0.3% pa to -0.31% pa. The Finnish IT contribution in the 2000s is unaected. For Sweden, the IT hardware contribution is raised dramatically in the late 1990s, from 0.24% pa to 0.41% pa, eliminating entirely the gap with the US which had been -0.18% pa using the national deators. In the 2000s, the contribution is reduced from 0.11% pa to 0.09% pa, such that the gap is reduced from +0.02% pa to 0% pa.
Regarding the small Northern European economies, for Austria, applying the OECD harmonised indices raises the IT contribution from 0.09% pa to 0.17% pa in the rst period, and from 0.01% pa to 0.08% pa in the second period, so that the gap with the US falls from -0.33% pa to -0.24% pa in the late 1990s, and from -0.08% pa to -0.01% pa in the 2000s. For Belgium, the IT contribution in the late 1990s is almost trebled, from 0.13% pa to 0.38% pa, almost eliminating the gap with the US, which moves from -0.28% pa to -0.04% pa. For the 2000s, it is increased from just 0.02% pa to as much as 0.18%, such that the gap with the US moves from negative to outstripping the US, from -0.07% pa to +0.09% pa. For Ireland, the contribution in the late 1990s is more than doubled, from 0.14% pa to 0.31% pa and reducing the gap relative to the US from -0.27% pa to -0.1% pa, whilst that in the 2000s doubles from 0.05% pa to 0.1% pa, so that the gap goes from -0.04% pa to +0.01% pa. For the Netherlands, applying the harmonised deators changes very little, with the national IT price index being very close to the OECD harmonised version. There, the IT contribution for the late 1990s moves in the other direction, dropping from 0.28% pa to 0.26% pa, such that the gap increases from -0.13% pa to -0.16% pa. In the 2000s, the IT contribution using national deators is already marginally higher than the US (0.1% pa compared to 0.09% pa), and applying the OECD deators raises the gap to +0.02% pa.
Moving on to the larger North European economies, for France, in the 1990s the IT contribution is raised from 0.03% pa to 0.09% pa, decreasing the gap relative to the US from -0.39% pa to a still large -0.33%
pa. The eect in the 2000s is smaller, with the contribution raised from 0.02% pa to 0.04% pa, reducing the gap in the 2000s from -0.07% pa to -0.05% pa. For Germany, applying the OECD indices has little eect on the IT contribution and even increases the gap relative to the US in the 2000s. The 1990s IT contribution remains at 0.26% pa using either deator, giving a gap of -0.15% pa. In the 2000s, use of the harmonised index reduces the contribution from 0.12% pa to 0.09% pa, and the gap moves from +0.03% pa to 0% pa.
Recall that Germany does not produce national price indices for IT equipment, so the deator used there was already a harmonised price index taken from EUKLEMS. For the UK, the impact is again quite small, with the national deator already incorporating large price declines in IT equipment. There, the IT contribution in the late 1990s is raised from 0.2% pa to 0.23% pa, reducing the gap with the US from -0.21% pa to -0.18% pa. In the 2000s, the contribution is almost doubled, from 0.04% pa to 0.07% pa, reducing the gap from -0.05% pa to -0.02% pa.
Finally, we look at the South European economies. For Spain, the IT contribution is more than trebled in the late 1990s, but from a low base, such that it is raised from 0.04% pa to 0.14%, but the gap remains at -0.28% pa having reduced from -0.37% pa. For the 2000s, the impact is larger, with the IT contribution raised from 0.01% pa to 0.08% pa, reducing the gap from -0.08% pa to -0.01% pa. For Italy, switching deators raises the IT contribution in 1995-00 from 0.06% pa to 0.14% pa reducing the gap with the US from -0.35% pa to a still substantial -0.28% pa. In the 2000s, the IT contribution is raised from 0.01% pa to 0.06% pa, reducing the gap with the US from -0.08% pa to -0.03% pa.
Therefore, we nd that, although there is some variation by country, a substantial part of the dierence between the IT contributions in the US and Europe can be explained by dierences in estimates of IT price changes. Using our growth accounting results for the EU-13 and the US, using national and OECD harmonised deators, switching to the OECD harmonised deators accounts for 15% of the gap in the IT contribution in 1995-00, 69% of the gap in 2000-07, and 21% of the gap in 2007-10. In 2010-13, the IT contribution in the EU-13 is already higher than estimates for the US, regardless of the price index used.
However, we nd that when we compare estimates of the contribution of CT equipment using the national and harmonised deators, we do not see the same eect, that is, switching to the harmonised deators does not explain so much of the dierence in the CT contribution relative to the US. Looking rst at the Scandinavian countries, applying the OECD harmonised deator to Denmark reduces the contribution of CT 
ConDlnKH ( Finland, the contribution of CT capital deepening in the late 1990s is raised but only reducing the gap by 0.01% pa in each period. For Sweden, the contribution of CT equipment is already higher than the US in the late 1990s. Using the harmonised deator actually reduces the contribution of CT capital deepening in Sweden in the late 1990s, from 0.24% pa to 0.22% pa, such that the gap moves from +0.08% pa to +0.06%
pa. In the 2000s, applying the harmonised deator raises the CT contribution from 0.06% pa to 0.08% pa, changing from -0.03% pa to -0.02% pa relative to the US .
Next, looking at the smaller Northern European economies, we do nd some impact from applying the OECD harmonised CT deator, although the absolute changes are much smaller than those to the contribution of IT hardware. For Austria, switching to the harmonised deators raises the CT contribution in the late 1990s from 0.08% pa to 0.11% pa, such that the gap with the US reduces from -0.08% pa to -0.05% pa. In the 2000s, the CT contribution is raised considerably, from 0.01% pa to 0.08% pa, almost eliminating the gap with the US which moves from -0.08% pa to -0.02% pa. For Belgium, switching deators doubles the CT contribution in the late 1990s from 0.03% pa to 0.06% pa, reducing the gap with the US from -0.13% pa to -0.1% pa. In the 2000s the CT contribution is more than doubled from 0.02% pa to 0.05% pa, reducing the gap from -0.07% pa to -0.05% pa. For Ireland, the CT contribution in the rst period is raised from 0.07% pa to 0.1% pa, and from 0.02% pa to 0.04% pa in the second period, reducing the gap from -0.08% pa to -0.06% pa in each period. For the Netherlands, switching deators has little impact, with the national CT deator exhibiting very similar price changes to the OECD harmonised deator. There, the CT contribution is actually reduced in the late 1990s, from 0.01% pa to 0% pa, increasing the gap from -0.15% pa to -0.16% pa, and remains at 0.01% pa in the 2000s, reducing the gap from -0.09% pa to -0.08% pa.
Turning to the large North European economies, rst, for France, applying the OECD harmonised deator raises the CT contribution in the 1990s from 0.03% pa to 0.04% pa, reducing the gap with the US from -0.13% pa to -0.11% pa. In the 2000s, the contribution doubles, from 0.02% pa to 0.04% pa, such that the gap falls from -0.08% pa to -0.06% pa. For Germany, in the late 1990s the contribution remains at 0.04% pa, such that the gap relative to the US remains at -0.12% pa, and in the 2000s the contribution is raised from 0.02% pa to 0.03% pa, such that the gap reduced from -0.07% pa to -0.06% pa. For the UK, the CT contribution in the 1990s rises from 0.11% pa to 0.12% pa, maintaining a gap of -0.04% pa, and in the 2000s the CT contribution is reduced from 0.05% pa to 0.04% pa, such that the gap increases from -0.05% to -0.06% pa.
Finally, we compare for Southern Europe. First, for Spain, the CT contribution is raised in the 1990s, but from only 0.01% pa to 0.02%, maintaining a gap with the US of -0.14% pa. In the 2000s, the CT contribution is raised from 0.02% pa to 0.04% pa, reducing the gap from -0.08% pa to -0.05% pa. For Italy, the contribution in the 1990s is raised marginally from 0.03% pa to 0.04% pa, such that the gap remains -0.12% pa. In the 2000s, the contribution is raised from 0.03% pa to 0.04% pa, and the gap reduced from -0.07% pa to -0.05% pa. Finally, for Portugal, the CT contribution in the late 1990s is raised from 0.06% pa to 0.1% pa, reducing the gap relative to the US from -0.1% pa to -0.05% pa. For the 2000s, the contribution increases less, from 0.06% pa to 0.07% pa, such that the gap remains at -0.03% pa.
Therefore we nd that, in general, unlike for IT hardware, increasing the consistency in CT price measures across countries explains less of the dierential in the contribution of CT equipment when comparing data 22 Where the change in contribution is more/less than the change in the gap with the US, this is due to rounding.
from EU countries with the US, although this does of course vary by country. The growth-accounting results presented in Tables 4 and 5 show that using OECD harmonised deators for CT equipment, as opposed to national deators, results in the contribution of CT capital deepening in the EU-13 being estimated as higher, but the dierence is marginal. In 1995-2000, the CT contribution remains at 0.05% pa. In both 2000-07 and 2007-10, the CT contribution is raised from 0.03% pa to 0.04% pa. In the nal 2010-13 period, the CT contribution is raised from 0.02% pa to 0.03% pa. The reason is that although application of the OECD harmonised indices raises the CT contribution in some economies, notably the small North European and Southern European economies in our categorisation, in the large Northern European economies and also Scandinavia, already aggressive national price indices mean there is less eect and in some cases the eect is reversed. Therefore we estimate that, in 1995-2000, 4% of the EU13-US gap can be explained by diering measurement of price change for CT equipment, rising to 16% in 2000-07, 18% in 2007-10, and 48% in 2010-13 . Thus, the smaller contribution of CT capital deepening in the EU-13 relative to the US is explained by dierences in growth of CT capital services and its factor income share, which depend in turn on the level of the CT capital stock, the rate of CT investment and the net rate of return to capital.
23
The other ICT asset not yet discussed is software. In the charts shown above, software is grouped with other national accounts intangibles, namely R&D, mineral exploration and artistic originals, but with software being the largest component. The charts show that use of the harmonised software deators generally increases the contribution of intangible capital deepening in EU-13 countries, especially in the late 1990s, reducing the gap relative to the US. For instance, in the late 1990s, applying OECD harmonised deators for software raises the contribution of intangibles in Sweden from 0.46% pa to 0.58% pa, in the Netherlands from 0.24% pa to 0.29% pa, in France from 0.20% pa to 0.34% pa, in the UK from 0.19% pa to 0.26% pa, in Spain from 0.03% pa to 0.07% pa, in Italy from 0.08% pa to 0.15% pa, and nally in Portugal from 0.1% pa to 0.15% pa. In the 2000s, the eect is less but still substantial in some cases. For instance, in
Denmark the contribution of intangibles is raised from 0.25% pa to 0.31% pa, and in Sweden from 0.24% pa to 0.31% pa. Of the North European economies, in the Netherlands, the intangibles contribution is raised from 0.17% pa to 0.23% pa, and in France from 0.2% pa to 0.25% pa. Of those in Southern Europe, in Spain the intangibles contribution is raised from 0.18% pa to 0.24% pa and in Italy from 0.05% pa to 0.1% pa.
In the growth-accounting tables presented in the appendix (Tables 4 and 5 In terms of individual countries, for which switching from national deators to OECD harmonised deators has the largest eect, for France, the switch raises the contribution of software capital deepening in 1995-00 from 0.15% pa to 0.29% pa, and in 2000-13, from 0.13% pa to 0.18% pa, such that the gap with 23 Other parameters such as the CT depreciation rate and holding gains/losses are not a factor in explaining dierences between countries: we apply the same depreciation rate for CT capital across countries and the use of harmonised deators also means that changes in valuation are fairly similar across countries.
the US is eliminated entirely in the rst period, moving from -0.15% pa to 0% pa, and surpassed in the 2000s, moving from -0.03% pa to +0.03% pa. For Italy, in the late 1990s the software contribution is raised from 0.09% pa to 0.15% pa, reducing the gap with the US from -0.21% pa to -0.14% pa, and in the 2000s the contribution is raised from zero to 0.06% pa, reducing the gap from -0.15% pa to -0.09% pa. For the Netherlands, the contribution in the late 1990s increases from 0.2% pa to 0.25% pa, reducing the gap from -0.09% pa to -0.04%, and in the 2000s from 0.12% pa to 0.18%, changing the sign relative to the US from -0.03% pa to +0.03% pa. For Sweden, in the 1990s the contribution is raised from 0.18% pa to 0.3% pa, fully eliminating the gap with the US which moves from -0.12% pa to 0% pa, and in the 2000s the contribution is raised from 0.08% pa to 0.15% pa, eliminating almost all of the gap with the US which moves from -0.07% pa to -0.01% pa.
Sources of Growth: GHE Harmonised ICT deators
As set out above, we also work with our own (GHE) set of harmonised deators, based on the ratio of CT prices to the implied price of value-added. Figure 11 presents estimates of the various sources of growth when we apply these alternative price indices. Focusing on the ICT contributions, we see that, although the GHE harmonised indices look very similar to the harmonised deators produced by the OECD, that for IT hardware is actually slightly more aggressive, so that applying them tends to raise the IT, and therefore ICT, contribution further, and therefore helps to explain more of the gap in ICT contributions relative to the US. Relative to the OECD harmonised deator, the GHE harmonised deators also raise the contribution of software capital deepening but reduce the contribution of CT capital deepening.
Looking rst at the IT hardware contributions, they are raised almost across the board such that the gap in the contribution relative to the US disappears for around half of the EU countries in our dataset.
First, of the Scandinavian countries, the IT contribution for Denmark is raised substantially in the late 1990s from 0.14% pa (national deator) to 0.55% pa (+0.14% pa relative to US) and in the 2000s from 0.08% pa to 0.2% pa (+0.11% pa relative to US). For Finland, the eect is less marked, there the contribution rises from 0.11% pa to 0.16% pa in the late 1990s (-0.25% pa relative to US) and from 0.03% pa to 0.04% pa in the 2000s (-0.05% pa relative to US). For Sweden, the eect is larger, there the IT contribution is raised from 0.24% pa to a very large 0.58% pa in the late 1990s (+0.17% pa relative to US), but is unchanged in the 2000s at 0.11% pa (+0.02% pa relative to US).
Second, of the smaller North European economies, for Austria the IT contribution is raised further, from 0.09% pa to 0.24% pa (-0.17% pa relative to US) in the late 1990s, and from 0.01% pa to 0.09% pa (0% pa relative to US) in the 2000s. For Belgium, the contribution is raised substantially, from 0.13% pa to 0.53% pa in the rst period (+0.11% pa relative to US) and from 0.02% pa to 0.19% pa in the second period (+0.1% pa relative to US). For Ireland, the late 1990s contribution rises from to 0.14% pa to 0.41% pa eliminating any gap relative to the US (0% pa), and in the 2000s from 0.05% pa to 0.1% pa (+0.01% pa relative to US).
For the Netherlands, the IT contribution in the rst period is raised from 0.28% pa to 0.36% pa (-0.05% pa relative to US), and in the second period from 0.1% pa to 0.12% pa (+0.03% pa relative to US).
Of the larger North European countries, for France the IT contribution in the rst period is raised from 0.03% pa to 0.12% pa (-0.29% pa relative to US) and in the second period from 0.02% pa to 0.04% pa (-0.05% pa relative to US). For Germany, the eect in the 1990s is more substantial, with the IT contribution raised from 0.26% pa to 0.35% pa (-0.06% pa relative to US), with less of an impact in the 2000s when the contribution is reduced from 0.12% pa to 0.1% pa (+0.01% pa relative to US). For the UK, again the largest impact occurs in the 1990s, with the contribution raised from 0.2% pa to 0.32% pa (-0.09% pa relative to 
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Finally, of the South European economies, for Spain, the 1990s IT contribution is raised substantially, from 0.04% pa to 0.2% pa (-0.22% pa relative to US), and also in the 2000s from 0.01% pa to 0.08% pa (-0.01% pa relative to US). For Italy, the IT contribution is raised from 0.06% pa to 0.19% pa (-0.23% pa relative to US) in the 1990s, and from 0.01% pa to 0.07% pa (-0.03% pa relative to US) in the 2000s. Finally, for Portugal, again the biggest impact occurs in the 1990s, where the IT contribution is raised from 0.11% pa to a large 0.41% pa (0% pa relative to US). In the 2000s, the Portuguese IT contribution is raised from 0.05% pa to 0.11% pa (+0.02% pa relative to US), thus eliminating any gap with the US in both periods.
Therefore using the GHE harmonised price indices can explain even more of the gap in IT contributions of the EU-13 relative to the US. Using our growth-accounting estimates (Tables 4 and 6 ) we estimate that for 1995-00, 43% of the IT gap relative to the US can be explained by price dierentials (compared to 15% using OECD harmonised deators), for 2000-07, 70% of the gap can be explained by prices (68% using OECD harmonised deators), and for 2007-10 it is 49% (21% using OECD harmonised deators). For 2010-13, EU-13 estimates for the contribution of IT capital deepening are higher than for the US using either national or both versions of the harmonised deators.
On software, we nd that the impact using the GHE harmonised indices is less but similar to that using the OECD harmonised indices. From the data presented in Tables 4 and 6 , we estimate that for 1995-00, price dierentials explain 20% of the gap in the software contribution relative to the US (34% using OECD harmonised deators), for 2000-07, 23% of the gap can be explained by price dierentials (40% using OECD harmonised deators), for 2007-10, prices explain 13% of the gap (25% using OECD harmonised deators), and for 2010-13, prices explain over 100% of the gap relative to the US (100% using OECD harmonised deators).
However, again, applying the GHE harmonised deators to CT equipment has far less impact than in the case of IT hardware, and also to a lesser extent software, such that the CT gap relative to the US persists for all countries with the exception of Sweden in the late 1990s. In cases where the gap relative to the US is reduced, the change tends to be quite marginal. Further, applying the GHE deators to CT equipment has slightly less impact than the OECD harmonised deators in terms of raising EU contributions. Using estimates provided in Tables 4 and 6 , we estimate that for 1995-2000, diering estimates of price change explain 0% of the gap in the CT contribution relative to the US (4% using OECD harmonised deators), for 2000-07, this rises to 14% (16% using OECD harmonised deators), for 2010-13, prices explain 13% of the gap (18% using OECD harmonised deators), and nally, for 2010-13, 35% (48% using OECD harmonised deators) of the gap relative to the US is explained by diering estimates of price changes for CT equipment.
To summarise, Figure 12 presents estimates of the contribution of CT capital deepening relative to the US, using each alternative deator.
Thus, from Figure 12 , the countries for which applying harmonised CT deators, as opposed to national deators, has the largest impact is Austria (both periods but in particular the second period), Portugal (particularly in the rst period), Ireland (both periods) and also Belgium (both periods). However, in aggregate, growth-accounting estimates for the EU-13 show that the contributions of CT capital deepening using GHE harmonised deators remain close to those using OECD harmonised deators. Moving from national deators to the OECD harmonised deators raises the contribution of CT capital deepening throughout the 2000s, from 0.03% pa to 0.04% pa in 2000-07, from 0.03% pa to 0.04% pa in 2007-10, and from 0.02% pa to 0.03% pa in 2010-13. Switching to the GHE harmonised deators has less impact still. The contribution of CT capital deepening remains the same as under the OECD harmonised deators for the rst three periods. 
Memo: US ConDlnKH(CT) 95-00=0.16%pa; 00-13=0.09%pa
ConDlnKH(CT): GHE Harmonised Deflators 1995-00 2000-13 Note to gure: Contribution of capital deepening in CT equipment (ConDlnKH(CT)) relative to the US, by country, such that positive values represent growth higher than the US and negative values lower than the US. Countries ordered by country group: Scandinavia, Northern Europe (small), Northern Europe (large) and Southern Europe.
Data for two periods: 1995-00 and 2000-13. Data for earlier years are missing for some countries. Therefore data for Belgium, Ireland, Portugal (1995-00) are from 1999 and data for Sweden are from 1997, rather than 1995. In rst chart, using national deators (top left), data for Denmark also start in 1999. In second chart, using OECD harmonised deators (top right), and third chart using GHE harmonised deators (bottom left), data for Denmark start in 1995. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) I CT /ΣI (00) I CT /ΣI (13) PKK CT /ΣPKK (00) PKK CT /ΣPKK (13) Δln(V/H) (00-13) ConΔln(K CT /H) (00-13) Share of LPG: (6) is the contribution of CT capital deepening, namely growth in CT capital services per hour multiplied by the CT share in total income, over the period 2000-13. Column 7 is the share of labour productivity growth accounted for by the contribution of CT capital deepening, estimated as column 6 over column 5. Growth rates are averages for the period shown and are calculated as the change in the natural log. All estimates produced using constant-quality OECD harmonised ICT deators.
In the nal 2010-13 period, the CT contribution is reduced to 0.02% pa. These results emphasise our nding that whilst inconsistencies in price estimates can explain a substantial part of the EU13-US gap in the IT hardware and software contributions, the same cannot be said of the CT contribution. Thus the gap in the EU CT contribution relative to the US is predominantly due to dierence in the growth of CT capital services and the CT factor income share, rather than diering estimates of price change for CT equipment. Table 3 summarises some of our key results. We present data for the period 2000-13, for our broader country aggregates, on the share of real CT investment in total real investment in 2000 and 2013 (columns 1 and 2), the share of nominal CT capital services in total nominal capital services in 2000 and 2013 (columns 3 and 4), labour productivity growth (column 5), the contribution of CT capital deepening (column 6), and nally the share of labour productivity growth accounted for by CT capital deepening (column 7, estimated as column 6 over column 5). All results presented in this table are estimated using the OECD harmonised ICT deators.
From Table 3 , columns 1 and 2, we see that real CT investment as a share of total real investment is highest in the US, at 4.5% in 2000, compared to 2.2% in the EU-13, and at 5.3% in 2013, compared to 3.1% in the EU-13. Data for EU country groups show that the CT real investment share is fairly similar across country groups. In 2000, it is highest in Scandinavia, and in 2013, it is highest in Southern Europe. In the nal row, we present data for Sweden as a memo item. We note that the share of real CT investment in Sweden is higher than that for each EU country group and higher than the average for all countries (rst row) in both 2000 and 2013. As a share of real investment, over the period CT investment has grown in all country and country groups presented here.
The contribution of capital deepening depends on the capital income share and growth in capital services.
In columns 3 and 4 we present the share of nominal CT capital services (i.e. CT user costs) as a share of total nominal capital services. First we note that, unlike the real investment share, the share of CT user costs in total capital user costs has declined over the period, and this is true for all countries and country groups presented here. Again, we note that the CT share in total capital is higher in the US relative to the EU-13, at 4.8% compared to 2.5% in 2000, and at 2.9% compared to 1.6% in 2013. CT capital shares in EU country groups are strikingly similar to those for the entire EU-13. The CT capital share is however higher in Sweden, where it is marginally higher than that in the US in 2013.
Columns 5, 6 and 7 present data on growth in labour productivity, the contribution of CT capital deep-ening to growth in labour productivity, and the share of labour growth accounted for by that contribution.
First, we note that, over the period, labour productivity growth was strongest in the US, at 1.7% pa compared to 1% in the EU-13. Within the EU-13, labour productivity growth was similar across country groups, at 1.1% pa, except for Southern Europe where labour productivity growth was weaker, at 0.6% pa. Again, we note that Sweden is an exception to this pattern, with labour productivity growth of 1.5% pa, higher than the all country average of 1.3% pa. On the contribution of CT capital deepening, column 6 shows that again this was highest in the US, at 0.09% pa compared to 0.04% pa in the EU-13. Within the EU-13, the CT contribution was lowest in the large North European countries, at 0.03% pa, the same as the EU-13 average in the small North European and South European economies at 0.04% pa, and highest in Scandinavia at 0.05% pa. Again, the Swedish performance stands out. There the CT contribution was higher than that in EU country groups, and the all country average, and marginally lower than the US, at 0.08% pa. Column 7 presents the share of labour productivity growth accounted for by the contribution of CT capital deepening.
That share is highest in South Europe, at 6.9%, due to weak labour productivity growth of just 0.6% pa. In the US, CT capital deepening explained 5.7% of labour productivity growth in the 2000s, compared to 3.9%
in the EU-13. EU country groups for which the share explained is higher than the EU-13 are South Europe (6.9%) and Scandinavia, at 4.5%. The share of labour productivity growth explained in Sweden was 5.3%, higher than the all country average of 5.1%.
Finally, in Figure 13 we explore the relative importance of individual assets in our various country groups using Harberger diagrams ( (Harberger, 1998) ; (Inklaar and Timmer, 2007) ), which highlight dierences in the magnitude of growth in capital services per hour and the dierence in capital deepening contributions by summarising the size of each assets share in total income. In Figure 13 we present the cumulative contribution of capital deepening in assets to labour productivity growth on the vertical axis. On the horizontal axis we show the cumulative share of each assets user costs in total income, such that the cumulative total is equal to the capital income share of approximately one-third. Assets are ranked according to growth in capital services per hour for each asset, such that the assets nearest the origin have the fastest growth in capital services per hour and assets furthest from the origin the slowest, giving the diagram a concave shape. In these diagrams we present capital deepening contributions for the years 2000-13, by country group. In estimating ICT capital services and ICT capital deepening contributions, we apply the OECD harmonised deators.
From Figure 13 we see that the aggregate contribution of capital deepening is largest in the US (1.04% pa), followed by South Europe (0.91% pa), then the small North European economies (0.87% pa), then Scandinavia (0.77% pa), and is smallest in the large North European economies (0.67% pa). The overall capital share is also largest in the US, at 0.41 compared to 0.36 in South Europe, 0.34 in North Europe (both small and large), and 0.33 in Scandinavia.
The asset with fastest growth in capital deepening is IT hardware, and this is so for all country groups considered. IT capital services per hour grew fastest in the small North European economies (11% pa) and Southern Europe (10.9% pa), followed by the larger North European economies (9.6% pa), Scandinavia (9.1% pa) and the US (8.3% pa). However, the large North European economies and South Europe have a smaller IT income share, at 0.007 and 0.006 respectively, compared to 0.011 in the small North European economies and Scandinavia, and 0.01 in the US.
The asset with second fastest growth in capital deepening is CT equipment, for all country groups except the small North European economies, where software has the second fastest growth in capital deepening, and CT equipment the third fastest. CT capital services per hour is similar across country groups, but grew fastest in Southern Europe (6.4% pa), followed by Scandinavia (6.3% pa), the US (6.1% pa), small North The gure also emphasises the dominance of buildings in capital services for all country groups. Growth in capital deepening in buildings is slow compared to most other assets, but as the gure shows, its income share is very large, and this is particularly so for Southern Europe where buildings user costs as a share of value-added is 0.21, compared to 0.15 in Scandinavia which has the smallest income share for buildings of the country groups considered here.
Conclusions
Numerous studies have documented the advances in ICT and sought to measure its contribution to growth in GDP or labour productivity. However the focus of these studies has generally been on the contribution of ICT equipment, with ICT equipment separated out from non-ICT plant & machinery in the estimation of capital services. The focus on computer hardware or aggregate ICT equipment means however that the C part of ICT has been somewhat neglected. In this paper, we conduct a sources of growth decomposition for the US and thirteen EU countries, and estimate the contribution of ICT capital, over the period 1995-2013, under dierent assumptions regarding its price, with a focus on the contribution of CT equipment. Following on from the research into IT hardware equipment, we therefore treat all three aspects of ICT capital, including telecommunications equipment (i.e. IT hardware, CT equipment and software), as distinct assets in the estimation of capital services, each with their own asset-specic depreciation rate and price index. We use these data to review growth-accounting estimates for each of the three types of ICT capital, and present estimates of the contribution of each ICT asset using (a) national deators as produced by national statistical institutes, (b) constant-quality harmonised deators from the OECD, and (c) our own constant-quality harmonised deators constructed for this paper.
We nd that national price indices for each ICT asset vary considerably. Across countries and between time periods, and depending on the price index used, we nd that the contribution of capital deepening in CT equipment is positive for all countries (including country aggregations) and time periods, and lies in the range of 0% pa to 0.16% pa. In general, we nd that the contribution of CT capital deepening was highest in Therefore, we nd that there are still considerable disparities in measures of ICT price change across OECD countries. In the case of IT hardware in particular, a substantial component of the dierence in US and EU contributions is explained by dierences in estimated IT price change. Thus harmonisation substantially reduces the US-EU gap. However, this is not the case for CT equipment, where harmonisation of prices only explains a small proportion of the gap in the capital deepening contribution of the EU relative to the US. Thus dierences in EU-US CT contributions are due to a lower rate of CT investment in EU-13, the sense of both current and past investments, where the former determine contemporaneous growth in capital services and the latter determine the level of the real stock. Therefore, in the case of CT equipment, variation between countries is likely aected by issues such as public policy, public nances and public investment in cases where some part or all of the telecoms network infrastructure remains in the non-market sector. The timing of network build-out and adoption lags are also likely a cause of variation between countries.
In this paper we have estimated the direct eect of telecommunications capital deepening on growth in labour productivity. However, since telecommunications capital builds networks, then it is also natural to ask whether there is an indirect eect too, that is implicit in measured TFP. In future work we shall seek to estimate those indirect network eects and their contribution to growth. times share in GVA. Column 6 is growth in R&D capital services per hour times share in GVA. Column 7 is growth in mineral exploration and artistic originals capital services per hour times share in GVA. Column 8 is growth in software capital services per hour times share in GVA. Column 9 is growth in IT hardware capital services per hour times share in GVA. Column 10 is growth in CT equipment capital services per hour times share in GVA. Column 11 is TFP, namely column 1 minus the sum of columns 2 to 10. Columns 12 and 13 are memo items: column 12 is the share of labour payments in GVA and column 13 is the share of labour productivity growth accounted for by the contribution of CT capital deepening, estimated as column 10 over column 1. In column 13, negative estimates caused by either negative growth in labour productivity or negative growth are Tornqvist indices. Column 1 is labour productivity growth in per hour terms. Column 2 is the contribution of labour composition, namely growth in labour services per hour times share of labour in GVA. Column 3 is the contribution of buildings capital deepening, namely growth in buildings capital services per hour times share of buildings in GVA. Column 4 is growth in vehicles capital services per hour times share in GVA. Column 5 is growth in plant & machinery capital services per hour times share in GVA. Column 6 is growth in R&D capital services per hour times share in GVA. Column 7 is growth in mineral exploration and artistic originals capital services per hour times share in GVA. Column 8 is growth in software capital services per hour times share in GVA. Column 9 is growth in IT hardware capital services per hour times share in GVA. Column 10 is growth in CT equipment capital services per hour times share in GVA. Column 11 is TFP, namely column 1 minus the sum of columns 2 to 10. Columns 12 and 13 are memo items: column 12 is the share of labour payments in GVA and column 13 is the share of labour productivity growth accounted for by the contribution of CT capital deepening, estimated as column 10 over column 1. In column 13, negative estimates caused by either negative growth in labour productivity or negative growth in CT capital deepening are suppressed. Country groups are as follows: Scand consists of Denmark, Finland and Sweden; N Europe (small) consists of Austria, Belgium, Ireland and the Netherlands; N Europe (large) consists of France, Germany and the UK;
and S Europe consists of Italy, Portugal and Spain. Note, countries with missing data are excluded from country groups and the all countries aggregate, thus Belgium, Ireland, Portugal and Sweden are excluded from aggregates for the 1995-00 period.
